In this study we investigate whether cross-country variation in investors' mean openness to experience -one of the traits of the Five-Factor Model of personality -has an effect on the level of foreign bias present in international equity portfolios. Building on extant research showing a strong relationship between openness to experience and the attitude towards other cultures and risk, we argue that this personality trait is a construct that aggregates aspects of the psyche that influence the propensity to invest abroad. We find support for this hypothesis, showing that the more 'open' the country, the smaller the underrepresentation of foreign assets in its equity portfolio. Our analysis reveals that this result is driven by the reluctance of investors from developed countries to accumulate assets from developing countries and suggests that international asset allocation is to some extent affected by psychological biases.
Introduction
Extant research presents clear evidence that investors prefer to invest in domestic stock markets in a far greater degree than is suggested by theoretical models (French and Poterba 1991) , in effect documenting a 'home bias' in equity portfolios. As a consequence, investors on average forego the diversification benefits of allocating resources on foreign markets (Grubel 1968) . Various explanations for this phenomenon have been proposed (Lewis 1999, Sercu and Vanpée 2007) , most of which attribute such divergence to a rational underlying factor. The fact that most investors overweight local assets in their portfolios means that their allocations in most foreign markets are sub-optimal, and thus a 'foreign bias'
exists. However, investors do not discriminate foreign markets uniformly, that is some markets are less underweighted than others. Chan et al. (2005) test a wide range of explanations for this variation and conclude that investors are more eager to allocate funds in countries that are more familiar and have more developed stock markets.
Academics have recently attempted to attribute the variation of home and foreign bias across countries to the existence of considerable cross-cultural differences around the world.
With regard to the home bias puzzle, Morse and Shive (2011) show that the tendency to overweight domestic assets is positively related to the mean level of patriotism in a given country. Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010) , on the other hand, focus on the variation in foreign bias across countries. They hypothesize that: (i) the greater the uncertainty avoidance of a culture (nation), the greater the reluctance of its' investors to include foreign assets in their portfolios, and (ii) given the existence of a link between individualism and overconfidence,
investors from more individualistic cultures should present a smaller degree of foreign bias in their portfolios, as they perceive foreign investments as less risky, than they are in reality.
They find empirical support for both of these hypotheses.
The aim of this study is to present and test a behavioral explanation for the variation in the average level of foreign bias across countries. Similarly to Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010) , we argue that the degree of underinvestment in a foreign market is in part driven by the risk propensity of investors from a given culture. However, contrary to their study, we argue that the sub-optimal allocation of funds abroad is to a certain extent the result of investors' attitudes towards other cultures, which in turn can be approximated by the openness to experience trait from the Five-Factor Model of personality. We conduct a test of this hypothesis on the basis of an extensive personality study of cultures supervised by McCrae and Terracciano (2005) that yielded mean personality trait levels in each culture.
The results we obtain show that the cultures that score higher on the openness to experience factor exhibit a smaller degree of foreign bias, thus confirming our hypothesis.
Interestingly, a subsample analysis shows that this is a reflection of the effect of variation in the openness to experience trait of investors coming from developed countries. Moreover, we document the existence of an interaction between this personality trait and the level of economic development of the country receiving the investment. Altogether, our results show that developing countries suffer from considerable biases as the result of variation in crosscultural attitudes. As it can be implied from this study, the advancement of capital market integration will only have a limited effect on the convergence of international portfolios, as the latter process requires a shift in the way investors assess foreign investments, which in turn is most likely deeply rooted in their personalities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present arguments in support of the notion that the degree of foreign bias should be linked to the openness to experience trait. Section 3 describes the date sources, variables and methodology employed in this study. Section 4 provides descriptive statistics for the key variables and presents results of the regression analysis. In section 5 we conclude our findings.
The personality of an investor and international asset allocation
Extant research has proposed several notions as to how the personality of an individual is structured, but the most widely accepted taxonomy is the Five-Factor Model (Digman 1990; McCrae and Costa 1992 Secondly, openness to experience is known to be related to risk propensity (Levenson 1990, Lauriola and Levin 2001) . Fenton-O'Creevy et al. (2004) show that openness to experience is the personality trait showing the strongest correlation with risk propensity and, most importantly, is positively and significantly related to the propensity to take financial risks. In a related manner, Aluja et al. (2003) show a positive correlation between openness to experience and the sensation-seeking measure. We mention these results, as it is argued in the literature that investors perceive the riskiness of domestic and foreign assets differently or that they simply fear foreign investments. The most direct evidence for the former can be found in Kilka and Weber (2001) , who document that the expected variation of returns is assessed to be smaller for domestic assets. The latter argument can be implied from the work of Huberman (2001) , who documents a preference for familiar stocks and thus implicitly suggests the existence of fear of the unfamiliar (foreign stocks). Perhaps building on this point, Solnik (2008) proposes a model in which investors underweight foreign assets due to the feeling of regret borne out of underperforming investments made abroad. as the surfacing of mutual fund bilateral holdings -both of them being more reliable data sources -has increased the robustness of research concerning the structure of international debt and equity portfolios. In this study we use the former data source.
Similarly to Chan et al. (2005) and Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010) , we compute the foreign bias measure as the log ratio of the observed weight to the weight that is optimal from a diversification perspective. However, the aforementioned authors use the mutual fund holdings database, which includes the value of domestic assets in each funds' portfolio, which necessitates the use of slightly modified formulas. In our case, for each investor country i the observed weight of recipient country r in its international portfolio is calculated as: ∑ where FPI is the value of foreign equity portfolio investments (in USD). The optimal weight is simply the share of recipient country r in the world portfolio (after subtracting the investor' countries market capitalization) and thus takes the form of:
where MCAP is the market capitalization of a given countries' stock market (in USD). Our dependent variable, foreign bias, takes the following form: Lo et al. (2005) demonstrate that the personality of investors (day-traders) shows no vivid deviations from a common structure of personality, it is plausible to assume that these scores should reflect the mean scores of investors from different countries.
Control variables
Research on the bias in equity portfolio allocations has shown that it is determined by a vast range of factors (Chan et al. 2005) . In this study, we utilize a comprehensive set of control variables that can affect the structure of international equity portfolio or the variation of personality traits across cultures. The first group of control variables is related to the country performing the foreign portfolio investments (the 'investor country'). Most importantly, we include variables describing the variation of cultural characteristics that have proven to have an impact on the over-or underweighting of domestic and foreign assets.
Thus, we include scores of uncertainty avoidance and individualism, two of Hofstede's (1980) dimensions, shown to have a negative and positive effect on the level of foreign bias, respectively (Beugelsdijk and Frijns 2010) . Next, we include estimates of patriotism across cultures, as Morse and Shive (2011) have demonstrated the existence of a positive relation between this trait and the level of home bias in a group of 24 countries. The addition of such a factor is warranted, as an over-allocation of funds domestically limits the extent to which investors can buy foreign assets (Chan et al. 2005) . As a consequence, we include an estimate of home bias, computed as in Fidora et al. (2007) . Finally, we control for the potential influence of economic indicators, which -as Leung and Bond (2004) argue -should be taken into account while making cross-cultural comparisons.
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The next group of variables is solely related to the country receiving the portfolio investments (the 'recipient country'). Following Chan et al. (2005), we include the log GDP per capita as a measure of economic development of the recipient country, and also include 1 and 5 year lagged returns to control for the possibility that investors might exhibit returnchasing behavior. We consider the influence of capital controls on international asset allocations by adding the Capital Account Openness Index (Chinn and Ito 2008) .
Furthermore, given that the attractiveness of a foreign portfolio investment is affected by the level of development of the recipient country's stock market, we control for the effect of differences in transaction costs (Rowland 1999) , market liquidity 5 (Bekaert and Harvey 2000) , market volatility and exchange rate volatility (Fidora et al. 2007) . 6 To measure the quality of investor protection in the recipient country, we also include the revised anti-director index (Djankov et al. 2008 ).
Our final group of controls is measured separately for each investor-recipient pair. We include two proxies of information asymmetry, which -as Sercu and Vanpée (2007) argueplays the most prominent role in explaining the degree of bias. As evidenced by Chan et al. (2005) , having a common language and geographic proximity are both related to foreign bias and are thus included in all specifications -these variables are both sourced from the GeoDist Database (Mayer and Zignano 2011) . In a related manner, following Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010) we also control for possible regional effects between the investor and recipient country. We do this by constructing a dummy variable taking the value of one, if both countries are members of either the European Union, NAFTA or ASEAN. To further investigate the possible impact of familiarity on international asset allocation we include a dummy variable equal to one, if the legal frameworks of the investor and recipient country are of the same origin (classifications are obtained from La Porta et al. 1999) . Lastly, we estimate the degree of correlation between the investors' and recipients' stock markets, to measure the diversification potential of the latter. The correlations are computed using monthly returns over a five year period.
Methodology
We use the most recent holdings data (from the end of year 2010). In our analysis, we include investor countries for which we can obtain personality trait scores, data regarding the mean uncertainty avoidance and individualism levels, as well as the mean level of patriotism.
There are 24 countries satisfying such criteria (15 of them being developed countries and 9 of them being developing countries). As for the recipient countries, we include each country for which we can obtain data regarding their attractiveness from the perspective of a foreign investor. Therefore, due to data limitations our sample includes 34 recipient countries (19 developed countries and 15 developing countries). Overall our sample includes 35 countries, with Spain being the only investor country that is not simultaneously assessed as a recipient country (due to the unavailability of transaction cost estimates). Our sample comprises 793
investor-recipient pairs.
To remain consistent with the study of Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010) , we use the Tobit model in our regression analysis. This method of estimation proves valuable, given that a significant number of observed portfolio weights are equal to zero (investor country i has no holdings in recipient country r). This allows us to overcome the potential impact of selection bias on parameter estimates. Table 1 presents data on the level of foreign bias in investor and recipient countries.
Empirical results

Descriptive statistics
The data shows large differences between developing and developed countries: developing markets are both more biased while making investments (the mean foreign bias is equal to -4.9 vs. a mean of -1.8 for developed markets) and while receiving them (-3.7 vs. -2.4). What's worth noting is that for developing countries the bias is greater while making investments than while receiving them, contrary to how the bias is structured in the case of the developed countries. 7 As for the range of the foreign bias, for investor countries it spans from -6.6
(Indonesia) to -0.73 (France). With regard to capital inflow, the most underweighted recipient country in our sample is China (-4.4), while the United States is the least underweighted country, with a mean foreign bias of -0.5.
To gain insight into the distribution of the openness to experience trait across countries we present the mean score in each of the investor countries in Table 2 . The scores range from 46.1 (the mean score for Argentina) to 55.2 (Denmark). An inspection of the data shows that developed countries tend to score higher on this personality trait than developing countries -13 out of 15 developing countries have a score of at least 50, while only 3 out of 9 developing countries exceed this threshold.
To assess the correlation between cultural and personality trait variables we compute Spearman rank correlations as reported in Table 3 (to obtain a fuller picture we include all of the five personality traits). Furthermore, to formally investigate the relation between economic development and the variables in question we also check how they correlate with the log of GDP per capita in the investor country. The results acknowledge the importance of taking into account well-being while analyzing cultural differences, as our economic development measure is significantly positively correlated with openness to experience and individualism, while at the same time being negatively correlated with the mean level of patriotism and conscientiousness in a given culture. As for the relationship between cultural and psychological variables, the results show that members of more individualistic cultures are on average more extravert, less conscientious and score lower on the uncertainty avoidance index than the remainder of cultures. The results are also in line with previous research showing a negative relation between neuroticism and risk propensity, as cultures having higher levels of the uncertainty avoidance also tend to be more neurotic. Furthermore, our data confirms McCrae and Terracciano's (2005) observation that openness to experience is negatively related to patriotism.
To obtain an even better understanding of the relation between personality traits and cultural dimensions with the level of well-being, we compare the mean scores in developed and developing countries (Table 4) . The results are mainly in line with the results from Table   3 -developed countries are significantly more open and individualistic, while at the same time being less patriotic and conscientious than developing countries. 'Individualism' prove to be statistically significant and carry the expected sign. There is also evidence of a strong role of information asymmetry and familiarity in determining the level of foreign country underweighting -as expected, geographic distance (negative effect) and the fact that both investor and recipient speak the same language or have a legal system of the same origin (positive effect) have a statistically significant impact on the degree of foreign bias. What's surprising is that only two of the variables describing the recipient countries' attractiveness ('Transaction costs' and 'Market liquidity') are statistically significant. The most puzzling result is that investors -as indicated by parameter estimates -tend to allocate relatively more funds in stock markets that are positively correlated with their domestic stock market, contrary to what was expected. However, we are not the first to present a link between foreign bias and stock markets' correlation that is inconsistent with economic theory -the lack of evidence for the diversification motive was documented in Chan et al. (2005) .
Regression results
We begin to test this papers' hypothesis in specification 1, which amends the base specification by the addition of the openness to experience variable. As the results show, the degree of openness to experience in investor countries has a positive and statistically significant influence on the level of foreign bias. This suggests that the initiative to invest in foreign capital markets might be inhibited by the reluctance to interact with other cultures or the fear of the unfamiliar embedded in one's personality. What is noteworthy is that the inclusion of our main independent variable has made 'Uncertainty avoidance' insignificant, which can be interpreted as evidence that openness to experience is a superior proxy for the risk propensity of investors with regard to foreign portfolio investments. We continue our analysis in specification 2, which contains an interaction term consisting of the openness to experience variable and a dummy variable coded as one when the investor country is developed. This allows us to test whether the effect of openness to experience on foreign bias is different for investors from mature and emerging economies. We find no evidence, at this level, that such an effect is present. Finally, to test differences in the effect of openness on the foreign bias with regard to where these decisions are made, we construct specification 3, which contains an interaction term made by multiplying the openness to experience score with a dummy variable equal to one, when the recipient country is developed. The results demonstrate that while the degree of openness in a culture seems to affect the underweighting of developing countries (positive and significant single term), its effect in the group of developed countries is very much limited, if at all present (negative and significant interaction term). At this point our findings suggest that the impact of openness on foreign bias seems to be driven not by the investments' source, but by its destination.
The results we have obtained so far warrant further investigation of the subsamples and thus we complement our analysis by constructing additional specifications. In specification 4 (reported in Table 6 ) we focus on the interaction between the openness to experience factor and the level of economic development of the recipient country, just as in specification 3. However, to make a more accurate assessment of this interaction, the interaction term includes the log of GDP per capita in the recipient country (instead of a dummy variable as in specification 3), which we offset so that the variable takes the value of zero for the lowest level of GDP per capita in our sample.
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We start by regressing specification 4 on the full sample, which yields estimates of the effect of openness to experience while making investments in the least economically developed recipient country (single term) and the adjustment that must be applied to this effect for investments in countries with more developed economies (interaction term). As is evident from an inspection of Table 6 the use of a more finely grained development proxy has raised the size and significance of both the single and the interaction term (the rest of the coefficients resemble the size and significance of those from specification 3). Next, we perform a subsample analysis, which enables us to exhibit potential differences in the effect of each regressor in developed and developing investor countries. As demonstrated in the penultimate column of Table 6 , the allocation decisions of investors from developed economies are influenced by a wider range of factors than earlier results would suggest, as the quality of investor protection and the fact that the investor and recipient country are part of the same trade regime both have a positive and significant coefficient. What's noteworthy is that in this subsample the degree of stock market correlation no longer seems to have an effect on the degree of foreign bias. 9 As for the developing investor subsample, the results reported in the last column of Table 6 seem to suggest that the variation in openness to experience has a positive effect on the degree of foreign bias while investing in the least developed countries (significant single term) and that this effect is not weaker while making investments in more developed countries (insignificant interaction term). However, an analysis of the degree of correlation between all of the regressors (unreported) suggests that these estimates might be affected by severe multicollinearity between two predictors -'Uncertainty avoidance' and 'GDP per capita in investor country'. We continue our analysis in specification 5 in which we drop 'Uncertainty avoidance' to circumvent multicollinearity issues.
Parameter estimates in specification 5 ran on the subsamples clearly paint a different picture than the former specification, as reported in Table 7 . In the developed investor subsample both 'Individualism' and 'Patriotism' become insignificant and the size of the effect of openness to experience on foreign bias decreases, but remains statistically significant at the same level. This is not the case, however, in the developing country subsample, where both the single and interaction term lose their significance. Furthermore, the decrease in the size of the coefficients for two regressors, namely 'Patriotism' and 'GDP per capita in investor country' should be interpreted as evidence of severe multicollinearity, which suggests that the results of specification 4 -especially with regard to the developing investor subsample -are not trustworthy. Altogether, our results demonstrate that investors from developed countries refrain from optimal allocations in less developed markets due to one of or a combination of underlying psychological factors, which are aggregated in the openness to experience personality trait. The variation in developing countries' openness seems from this perspective to have no effect on the divergence of their international portfolios from optimal portfolios. However, the inability to demonstrate the existence of such an effect in the developing investors' subsample can be due to poor quality holdings data or the inaccuracy of the personality scores.
We feel that an appropriate way to summarize the most credible results we have obtained so far 10 is to show how the effect of variation in the openness to experience trait is different depending on where the investment is made, as illustrated in Figure 1 . The existence of an interaction effect between openness to experience and the economic development of the recipient country (for both the full sample and the developed investor subsample) is demonstrated by the declining slope, which shows that the greater the level of development of the recipient country, the smaller the influence of psychological biases in international asset allocation. 11 What is noteworthy is that the rate of decline shows that differences in investors' openness to experience no longer have an effect on the degree of foreign bias while investing in the most developed countries in our sample (i.e. Japan and Norway, which are 3.92 units above India, the least economically developed country).
To assure that our main findings are not driven by the omission of other plausible predictors of foreign bias, the choice of estimation procedure, or sample selection, we employ a series of robustness tests. 12 Firstly, analogously to Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010), we add variables describing the remainder of psychological traits from the Five-Factor Model. By 10 That is those reported in Table 7 . 11 Although the estimates seem to suggest the existence of an inverse relationship for the developing investor subsample -as demonstrated by the ascending slope -we refrain from making any inferences, given the lack of statistical significance of this result. 12 We use specification 5 as the referential specification used in our tests. The results of the robustness analysis are reported in Table 8 and Table 9 . For brevity we only exhibit estimates of the effect of openness to experience on foreign bias and the interaction term.
doing so, we indirectly test whether openness to experience is indeed an autonomous factor (as postulated by theory). As the results in Table 8 show, although the inclusion of these variables makes the key independent regressor insignificant in the full sample, crucially, in the developed investor subsample both the size and significance of the single and interaction term remain intact. All of the other personality traits -bar neuroticism -seem to have no influence on the degree of foreign bias.
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Secondly, we check whether the use of OLS to estimate parameters yields different results. As is demonstrated in Table 9 , if we regress our specification on the full sample the single term's size is decreased but remains statistically significant, although we are not able to reject the hypothesis that the effect of openness to experience on foreign bias is different while investing in wealthier countries. However, for the developed investor subsample both the single and interaction term's size and significance resemble those that we obtained while using the Tobit procedure.
Although not strictly a robustness test, we reapply the OLS procedure on modified samples, created by discarding all zero weight observations, to gain insight into the extent that our results are driven by the zero observed investor-recipient weights (i.e. when an investor country has no equity holdings in a particular recipient country). Results show that while the coefficients retain their expected sign they are no longer statistically significant. This we believe is simply an indication that the countries that receive no equity investment are simply the ones towards which investors exhibit the strongest biases.
Nevertheless, given the fact that the way we treat zero observed weights clearly has a significant impact on our results, in the next robustness test we censor these observations at a different level than the arbitrarily chosen log of 0.001. However, neither censoring at -9.21
(log of 0.0001) nor -13.49 (the lowest observed measure of foreign bias) changes the sign or significance of the single or interaction term.
Finally, we investigate whether our main findings are replicable on different datasets.
We test this by using CPIS data from earlier years (each of the five years before 2010 separately). 14 Although the size of the coefficients vary from year to year (the single term's coefficient ranges from 0.127 to 0.310), they retain their sign and significance in every case.
Conclusion
Just as the international portfolios underweight foreign assets, the discussion on the reasons for the divergence between observed and optimal portfolios seems to underweight the explanatory role of behavioral and cultural factors. This study contributes to this debate by providing evidence that the mean openness to experience in a given culture has a positive and statistically significant impact on the level of foreign bias. The fact that our results remain robust after including measures of patriotism and uncertainty avoidance suggests the openness to experience personality trait is a good proxy of the propensity to allocate funds globally embedded in investors' minds.
We demonstrate that this result is largely driven by the prominent role of differences in the personalities of investors from developed countries. This, we believe, should not be necessarily interpreted as evidence that the allocation patterns of investors from developing countries are not susceptible to the influence of the same array of psychological factors that affect investors from more mature economies. What our results do confidently portray, however, is that only the less developed economies seem to be the victims of psychological biases nested in foreign investment decision-making. In effect, they receive less foreign capital relative to the value of their stock market than mature countries, and thus are burdened by an elevated level of the cost-of-capital, due to less risk sharing among investors. Given that 14 For brevity, we run the regressions solely on the developed investor subsample.
changes in the attitudes towards other cultures are most likely fueled by the relatively slower process of economic development, the progression of capital market integration seems to be the most promising way to overcome these adversities. This table reports the regression coefficients for the openness to experience variable and its interaction term with GDP per capita in recipient country, obtained by utilizing the predictors from specification 5. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***,**,* denote significant coefficients at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. Full sample Developed investor Developing investor
Openness to experience (O)
O
